![]() ![]() ![]() This discussion is extremely interesting and leads to some conclusions like “A possible world… is a possible state of affairs in the broadly logical sense… a state of affairs S is complete or maximal if for every state of affairs S’, S includes S’ or S precludes S’. ![]() The discussion of how we should define worlds, books (which I take to mean a list of propositions that belong to a given world), actuality, possibility, and the like. ![]() Chapter IV I found particularly interesting, as Plantinga’s discussion here starts to turn to modal logic. It is quite an interesting section, and one in which I think Plantinga makes a strong case. The first few chapters compose Plantinga’s argument for de re necessity by showing that such things can be shown in de dicto terms. De dicto necessity he defines as “a matter of a proposition’s being necessarily true (v)” while de re necessity is “an object’s having a property essentially or necessarily.” In it, Plantinga tackles “The distinction between necessary and contingent truth (1)…” He distinguishes necessity de re and de dicto necessity. The Nature of Necessity by Alvin Plantinga is quite the philosophy book. This is one I’ve been working through for months. Alright, I managed to finish another book this weekend. ![]()
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